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THE DUTY TO PROTECT: BLACKSTONE'S DOCTRINE 
OF !N LOCO PARENTIS: A LENS FOR VIEWING THE 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF STUDENTS 
Todd A. DeMitchelf 
A central purpose of law is to protect the weak from the 
strong and to compensate victims for injuries caused by care-
lessness and neglect. Unfortunately, when confronted by child 
abuse in the schools, courts often fail to fashion effective reme-
dies.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The sexual abuse of a child is a loathsome act. 1 That act is 
particularly heinous when it is perpetrated by a person who 
has power over the child due to a position of trust. In a child's 
life, parents and teachers hold recognized and dominant posi-
tions of trust. 2 The sexual abuse of a child by a parent is con-
sidered taboo in almost every society. Is the taboo regarding 
the sexual abuse of a student by his or her teacher similar to 
that involving the parent? 
* Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Education, University of New 
Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire. B.A., M.A.T., University of La Verne; M.A., 
University of California-Davis; Ed.D., University of Southern California; Post-
Doctorate, Harvard University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 
"The Sir William Blackstone Colloquium on Public School Law" sponsored by the Ox-
ford Round Table on Education Policy, St. Antony's College, Oxford University, Oxford, 
England, July 2000. The author thanks the Round Table participants for their insight-
ful comments and stimulating discussion regarding the earlier draft of the paper. Their 
comments were most helpful in preparing this manuscript. 
**Todd A. DeMitchell & Richard Fossey, The Limits of Law-Based School Reform: Vain 
Hopes and False Promises 102 (Technomic Publg. Co. 1997). 
l.Child sexual abuse has been defined as "behavior that is sexual in nature, unwel-
come, and in which the adult party holds some form of power or control over the minor 
party, as in a teacher-student relationship." Audrey Cohan et a!., Sexual Harassment 
and Sexual Abuse: A Handbook for Teachers and Administrators 14 (Corwin Press, Inc. 
1996). 
2. For a discussion of the role of exemplar which society has placed on teachers 
see Todd A. DeMitchel!, Private Lives: Community Control us. Professional Autonomy, 
78 Educ. L. Rptr. 187 (1993). 
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No harm betrays the trust between educator and student 
more than the sexual abuse of the student. Because of the spe-
cial relationship that exists between student and educator, the 
harm from sexual abuse flows from the individual through the 
entire educational community leaving few untouched by the 
bitter taste of the ashes of betrayal. 3 Richard Riley, former 
United States Secretary of Education, summed it up when he 
stated, "[a]ny sexual harassment of a student-particularly 
sexual abuse by a teacher-is a basic breach of trust between 
the school and the student and family."4 It is a harm not easily 
tolerated by society. At least that is what we say. Yet there is a 
concern that students who attend school are not protected to 
the degree that they should be by either a professional ethos 
that covets children or a judicial presence that protects them." 
Parents have a cluster of rights regarding the upbringing of 
their children. From these rights accrue responsibilities. 6 Yet 
these rights may be fiduciary in that they must be exercised in 
the best interests of the children. When parents send their 
children to school, in accordance with compulsory education 
laws, the school, through its educators, assumes some of the 
duties owed by the parent to the child. In 1769, Sir William 
Blackstone captured the essence of this responsibility when he 
articulated the doctrine of in loco parentis by asserting that 
part of the authority of the parent is delegated to the school-
master.7 According to the in loco parentis doctrine, a parent 
"may ... delegate part of his [or her] parental authority ... to 
3. Gail Sorenson echoes this sentiment when she writes: "when teachers and 
other trusted professionals, year after year, are permitted to harass and abuse stu-
dents in school, there will be ripple effects on all of us for an inestimable time to come." 
Gail Sorenson, Employee Sexual Harassment and Abuse of Students in Schools: Recent 
Developments in Federal Law, 97 Educ. L. Rptr. 997, 1010 (1995). 
4. Mark Walsh, Riley Restates Rules Against Harassment, 17 Educ. Week 30 
(July 8, 1998) (available at <http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=42harass 
.h17>). 
5. See Todd A. DeMitchell, Sexual Abuse of Students: Actual Notice and Deliber-
ate Indifference. The Supreme Court's Title IX Standard for School District Liability, 7 
Inti. J. Educ. Reform 372 (1998). 
6. See e.g. John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Governm.ent, in On Politics 
and Education, 75, 101 (Walter J. Black Inc. 1947) ("all parents [are], by the law of Na-
ture, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children they [have] 
begotten."); Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 5 Geo. J. on Fighting Pov. 313 (1998) (discuss-
ing the rights of children as an outgrowth of parents' responsibility to secure the well 
being of their children). 
7. William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 1, *453. 
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the tutor or schoolmaster of his [or her] child; who is then in 
loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent 
committed to his charge, ... that of restraint and correction, as 
may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is em-
ployed."8 Schools assume custody of students while they are 
deprived of the protection of their parents while attending 
school. 9 "The doctrine in loco parentis encompasses the common 
law view of the legal status of minors in the public school set-
t . ,10 mg. 
Acting in the place of parents is an accepted and expected 
role assumed by educators and their schools. This doctrine has 
been recognized in state statutes11 and court cases. 12 For exam-
ple, the United States Supreme Court noted that there exists 
an "obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authori-
8. Id. 
9. Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 278 (N.H. 1995) ("School attendance impairs 
both the ability of students to protect themselves and the ability of their parents to pro-
tect them .... Instead, the duty to protect falls upon employees who have a supervisory 
responsibility over students and who have thus stepped into the role of parental 
proxy."); see e.g. Laura Beresh-Taylor, Student Author, Preventing Violence in Ohio's 
Schools, 33 Akron L. Rev. 311, 320 n. 46 (2000); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Determining 
Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to Control and Punish 
Students, 10 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 397, 452 (2001) ("When children enter the pub-
lic schools, they leave their parents behind and experience a unique context, one con-
trolled by state officials. At school, these officials have temporary custody of students to 
further their primary goal-education."). 
10. J. Chad Mitchell, Student Author, An Alternative Approach to the Fourth 
Amendment in Public Schools: Balancing Students' Rights with School Safety, 1998 
BYU L. Rev. 1207, 1212 (footnote omitted). 
11. E.g. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 44807 (West 1993) (a teacher can exercise the 
same degree of physical control over a student that a parent legally could); Ga. Code 
Ann. § 20-2-215 (2001) (classroom aides have authority of in loco parentis except re-
garding corporal punishment); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4203(b) ("The general assembly 
recognizes the position of the schools in loco parentis and the responsibility this places 
on principals and teachers within each school to secure order and to protect students 
from harm while in their custody."); W.Va. Code§ 18A-5-1 (2001) (teacher shall stand 
in the place of the parent in exercising authority over the school). 
12. E.g. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (acknowledg-
ing that for many purposes school authorities act in loco parentis); Gonyaw ex rel. Gon-
yaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D. Vt. 1973) ("[o]fnecessity, parents must delegate 
some disciplinary authority over their school children to . . . teachers."); In re 
Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (App. 3d Dist. 1969) (holding that a school stands in 
loco parentis allowing the use of moderate force in disciplining students just as parents 
have the right to use moderate force to gain obedience from their children), overruled, 
In re G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1292-93 (Cal. 1985) (holding that common law doctrine of in 
loco parentis was superceded by California Education Code Annotated § 44807); Ran-
niger v. Tex., 460 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (holding that a principal stood 
in loco parentis "with the parent's duties, rights and responsibilities"). 
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ties acting in loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a 
captive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, 
or lewd speech."13 According to the Supreme Court, school offi-
cials have authority over students by virtue of in loco parentis 
and a concomitant duty of protection. It has been asserted that 
in loco parentis is a sub-set of government's broad common law 
f . 14 power o parens patrwe. 
This paper will use Blackstone's doctrine of in loco parentis 
as a lens for viewing the sexual abuse of a student by an educa-
tor. It will attempt to show that the current theories of respon-
sibility-respondeat superior, special relationship, and Title 
IX-regarding the sexual abuse of students are inadequate. 
Blackstone's in loco parentis theory of responsibility may pro-
vide a more appropriate vehicle for the protection of children in 
school. If educators act in the place of parents, should they be 
held to a similar duty to protect the children entrusted to their 
care? 
II. PARENTAL DUTY 
Parental rights are not unfettered. They come with the duty 
to protect and care for the child. 15 Unfortunately, not all chil-
dren are reared in loving homes by responsible parents. "There 
is growing public awareness of the victimization of children at 
the hands of their parents."16 For example, a mother's parental 
13. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser ex rel. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). 
14. Maggie J. Randall Robb, Student Author, A School's Duty to Protect Students 
from Peer-Inflicted Abuse: Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996), 22 U. Day-
ton L. Rev. 317, 328 n. 114 (1997); see generally Black's Law Dictionary 1114 (6th ed., 
West 1990) ('"Parens patriae' ... refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and 
guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles .... Parens patriae origi-
nates from the English common law where the King had a royal prerogative to act as 
guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants. In the United States, the 
parens patriae function belongs with the states."). Through this doctrine, the state has 
the power as well as the duty to protect its minor citizens. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 649 (1972). The doctrine of parens patriae supports the concept of schools acting in 
loco parentis to protect students. 
15. 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child§ 14 (1987). 
16. Colleen McMahon, Due Process: Constitutional Rights and the Stigma of Sex-
ual Abuse Allegations in Child Custody Proceedings, 39 Catholic Law. 153, 153 (1999); 
see Howard A. Davidson, Protecting America's Children: A Challenge, 35 Tr. 23, 24 
(Jan., 1999) ("[m]uch has been written and discussed in the child welfare community 
about how policies favoring family preservation have too often come at the expense of 
children's safety." (footnote omitted)); Mark Strasser, Fit tu be Tied: On Custody, Dis-
cretion, and Sexual Orientation, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 841, 863 (1997) ("[g]iven the grow-
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rights were terminated where she refused to believe the allega-
tions of sexual abuse against the father despite overwhelming 
evidence, and she failed to protect the children from their fa-
ther.17 Furthermore, one commentator argued, "[p]arents who 
do not acknowledge abuse and continue to expose their children 
to known abusers should be held liable for the resulting abuse 
the child suffers."18 
Parents clearly owe a duty to protect their children, and a 
breach of that duty may result in adverse action against the 
parent, such as the loss of parental rights or authority. For ex-
ample, California Welfare and Institutions Code Annotated § 
366.26 provides for the termination of parental rights. Accord-
ing to the California Supreme Court, all minors have a compel-
ling right to be protected from abuse and neglect. 19 Parental 
rights may be terminated when the welfare of the child is at 
risk. Therefore, the welfare of the child is considered more im-
portant than the rights of the parent. 20 
In addition to the states' ability to remove parental rights 
in its capacity of parens patriae, in some states children have 
the right to sue their parents for negligence, thus abrogating 
parental immunity from suit. 21 For example, in 1967, the doc-
trine of parental immunity was first recognized in Arizona. 22 
ing number of reported child abuse cases, courts must be sensitive to concerns that 
children can be hurt severely or even killed by their parents." (footnotes omitted)). 
17. Gallupe v. Roanoke City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 1998 WL 864424 (Va. App. Dec. 
15, 1998) (unpublished). 
18. Amy L. Nilsen, Student Author, Speaking Out against Passive Parent Child 
Abuse: The Time Has Come to Hold Parents Liable for Failing to Protect Their Chil-
dren, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 253, 262 (2000). 
19. In re H., 851 P.2d 826, 833 (Cal. 1993). 
20. Kerry L. Mcbride, Student Author, A Minor's Right to "Divorce" His or Her 
Parents: Fundamental Liberty Interest and Standing of a Minor Who Is Dependent on 
the Courts to bring Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 17 J. Juv. L. 68, 78 
(1996). 
21. E.g. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653-54 (Cal. 1971) (abolishing the doc-
trine of parental immunity); Flynn ex rel. Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788 (Iowa 
1981) (abolishing the doctrine of parental immunity). The first case to recognize the 
doctrine of parental immunity was Hewellette u. George, 9 S. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891) 
(reasoning that "(t]he peace of society, and of the families composing society ... forbid 
to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress 
for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent."), overruled, Denton ex rel. 
Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 S.2d 906, 912 (Miss. 1992). 
22. Purcell ex rel. Frazer u. Frazer, 435 P.2d 736, 739 (Ariz. App. 1967) (holding 
that an unemancipated minor child cannot sue a parent for negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle because of parental immunity), overruled, Streenz ex rel. Francy v. 
Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (Ariz. 1970) (holding "that an unemancipated minor child 
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Three years later, the Arizona Supreme Court overruled the 
1967 decision thereby allowing a child to sue her parents for in-
juries sustained in a car accident. 23 The Arizona Supreme 
Court later refined its previous holding by adopting a reason-
able parent standard for suits brought against parents by their 
child.24 While announcing the reasonable parent standard, the 
court noted that the traditional parental immunity doctrine did 
not apply, inter alia, "if the parent is acting outside his [or her] 
parental role and within the scope of his [or her] employment; 
if the parent acts willfully, wantonly, or recklessly; ... and if 
the tortfeasor is standing in loco parentis, such as a grandpar-
25 
ent, foster parent, or teacher." The Arizona Supreme Court 
acknowledged the parental duty to protect a child through the 
concept of a reasonable parent standard. The concept of teach-
ers standing in loco parentis holds them to the same standard 
of reasonableness as parents. This is important because in 
cases of students being sexually abused by an educator, the 
imputation of in loco parentis to educators does not arise 
within the need to discipline the child. Protecting a child is not 
asserted as a right of the parent or surrogate, but rather as a 
duty owed to the child/student. 
Because children spend large amounts of time in school, 
Blackstone's doctrine of in loco parentis is central to the duty 
owed to children. In Blackstone's time, the concept of public 
schools had not developed into the concept of today's free com-
mon school supported by the state. Today, the role of public 
schools in America is complex. Education is both a private 
benefit and a public good. Because the concept of a public 
school has morphed to meet this complexity, the school as an in 
loco parentis has also undergone a transformation since Black-
stone articulated the concept. 26 
has a right of action against her parents for injuries incurred in an accident allegedly 
caused by [a parent's] negligent driving''). 
23. Streenz ex rel. Francy v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 285 (Ariz. 1970), overruled, 
Broadbent ex rel. Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995). 
24. Broadbent ex rel. Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995). 
25. I d. at 46. 
26. SeeKnox County Bd. Of Educ. Assn. V. Ed. of Educ., 158 F. 3d 361, 366 (6th Cir. 
1999) ("While serving in their in loco parentis capacity, teachers are on the 'frontline' of 
school security including drug interdiction."). 
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Ill. IS IN LOCO PARENTIS DEAD OR ALIVE? 
Blackstone referred to a schoolmaster who was often the 
sole individual responsible for the child's education. The mod-
ern analogy in the United States, Australia, Canada, and 
South Africa is the school or school district. Educational policy, 
formulated by school districts, is carried out and translated and 
27 transformed by educators. 
Some commentators have raised the question: is in loco 
parentis dead?28 However, news of the doctrine's death is pre-
mature. As recently as 1996, a New York court wrote, "the 
school, once it takes over physical custody and control of the 
children, effectively takes the place of their parents and 
d. ,29 guar 1ans. 
The modern day doctrine of in loco parentis has been de-
fined and shaped by two public school search and seizure cases. 
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the United States Supreme Court 
noted that "[i]n carrying out searches and other disciplinary 
functions pursuant to [mandatory educational and disciplinary] 
policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not 
merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the 
parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amend-
ment."30 The Court did not dissolve the in loco parentis rela-
tionship; rather it encapsulated it. The Court did not say that 
the school never acts in the place of the parent. 31 The Court 
27. See Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in 
Public Services (Russell Sage Found. 1980). 
28. E.g. Kelly Frels, Balancing Students' Rights and Schools' Responsibilities, 37 
Hous. L. Rev. 117, 120 (2000) ("Is in loco parentis dead?" (emphasis added)); Michael 
Imber & Tyll Van Gel!, Education Law 106 (2d ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 2000) 
("the doctrine of in loco parentis has been largely abandoned." (emphasis added)); Anne 
Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Pub-
lic Schools, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 49, 60 (1996) ("(w]hen the Tinker Court declared 
that constitutional rights followed students through the schoolhouse gate, the notion 
that school power was like that of a parent-the common-law doctrine of in loco par-
entis-slipped out the back door." (emphasis added)); see also Timothy L. Jacobs, 
School Violence: An Incurable Ill that Should Not Lead to the Unconstitutional Com-
promise of Students' Rights, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 617, 620 (2000) (An oblique view of the 
demise of in loco parentis: "The United States Supreme Court has discarded this doc-
trine, but recent school shootings may prompt a reemergence of the doctrine of in loco 
parentis."). 
29. Garcia v. City o{N.Y, 646 N.Y.S.2d 508,509 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1996). 
30. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985). 
31. The strength of this assertion is found in Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1268 
(lOth Cir. 2001) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 ("However, 'school personnel do not 
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said that within the special context of search and seizure, the 
school functions as a representative of the state. In loco par-
entis may be "in tension with contemporary reality", but the 
Court did not find it in opposition to contemporary reality. 3~ 
The role of school authorities encompasses, but is not restricted 
to, the functions of the parent. School officials are also state ac-
tors furtherinB "publicly mandated educational and discipli-
nary policies."'· 
One year after T.L.O., the Supreme Court in Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser ex rel. Fraser, a major student free 
speech case, noted that schools act in loco parentis to protect 
students. 34 This maintains the viability of in loco parentis by 
adding weight to the argument that the High Court in T.L.O. 
did not abolish the doctrine. 
The school also acts as a sovereign, protecting the constitu-
tional and statutory rights of students. The Supreme Court 
supported its position in Bethel in a later search and seizure 
case involving drug testing of students. The Court in Vernonia 
School District 47J v. Acton referred to Blackstone's in loco 
parentis doctrine but acknowledged that public schools exercise 
a state power greater than parental power over their stu-
dents.05 Parental rights are not subject to constitutional re-
straints, but public schools must respect the constitutional 
rights of students. 36 However, the Court did not assert that the 
schools never act in loco parentis. In fact, the court, citing Be-
thel, wrote, "we have acknowledged that for many purposes 
'school authorities ac[t] in loco parentis'.":l7 The schools, while 
in the role of educator, act as a parent by instructing and disci-
plining their students. 
Accordingly, the Court in Vernonia, referring to New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., emphasized that the nature of the power over stu-
merely exercise authority conferred on them by individual parents."') Earls by way of 
T.L.O. acknowledges that schools have conferred upon them the role of in loco parentis. 
However, that role is no the only source of authority.). 
32. !d. at 336. 
33. !d. 
34. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser ex rel. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). 
35. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). 
36. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969) (students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate.") 
37. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (brackets in origi-
nal) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser ex rel. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 
(1986)). 
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d~nts "is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervi-
Sion and control that could not be exercised over free adults."38 
Custodial power over children is the power often associated 
with parental control over children. A dictionary definition of 
" t d' " !' k 39 cus o Ian re1ers to a eeper or guardian. "Tutelary" means 
"having the position of guardian or protector of a person place 
th . ~Bh ' ' or mg. ot the definitions of "custodian" and "tutelary" 
refer t.o a guardian. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 
"guardian" means, among other definitions, "[o]ne who legally 
has responsibility for the care and management of the person, 
or the estate, or both, of a child during its minority."41 Also, a 
guardian is someone who "guards, protects, or preserves .... 
[A] person legally entrusted with the care of another's person 
or property, as that of a minor."42 By describing the relation-
ship between student and school as custodial and tutelary, the 
Court is essentially saying that the school acts as a guardian. 
Schools act as guardians for students by protecting them from 
harm. Because schools act as guardians, it is clear that the 
schools have some duty of in loco parentis. The Court has 
opined that the relationship is not exclusively in loco parentis, 
but that for many purposes school authorities do act in that ca-
pacity. 43 Rossow and Stefkovich asserted that in loco parents is 
invigorated by Vernonia. 44 
Parents and schools acting in loco parentis owe a duty to 
protect children/students. In Hinson v. Holt, a case out of Ala-
bama, a teacher who was sued for assault and battery raised a 
defense of parental immunity based on the doctrine of in loco 
parentis.45 The teacher argued that the Alabama Supreme 
38. !d. 
39. Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 326 (Sol Steinmetz et al. eds., 2d 
ed., Random H. 1997). 
40. !d. at 1388. 
41. Black's Law Dictionary 706 (6th ed., West 1990). 
42. Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 576 (Sol Steinmetz et al. eds., 2d 
ed., Random H. 1997). 
43. The statement of the Court in Vernonia that school officials do not "exercise only 
parental power over their students" clearly indicates that the High Court believes that 
school officials exercise in loco parentis responsibilities in addition to other powers and 
responsibilities. 515 U.S. at 655. 
44. Lawrence F. Rossow & Jacqueline Stefkovich, Vernonia School District v. Ac-
ton: Suspicionless Drug Testing, 102 Educ. L. Rptr. 897, 907 (1995); see Ira Mickenberg, 
Court Settles on Narrower View of 4th Amendment, Nat!. L. J. C8 (July 31, 1995) (not-
ing the Vernonia Court's heavy reliance on the school's in loco parentis responsibility). 
45. Hinson v. Holt ex rel. Holt, 776 S.2d 804, 811 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). 
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Court in Suits v. Glover recognized a qualified privilege for an 
educator's discipline of a student.46 The defense argued that if 
the teacher stands in loco parentis, then the responsibilities 
and the rights of the parent must accrue to the teacher stand-
ing in loco parentis to the student. Thus, the teacher is pro-
tected by the traditional parental immunity doctrine, which is 
still recognized in Alabama. Under Alabama law, the parental 
immunity doctrine prohibits suits brought by minor children 
against their parents.47 The lone exception to this immunity 
doctrine in Alabama occurs when the allegation against the 
parent is one of sexual abuse. 48 The court in Hinson held that 
foster parents, like educators, are not legal parents.49 They act 
in loco parentis and are "entitled to only a 'qualified form' of 
t l . "t ,so paren a 1mmum y. 
The schools and its educators stand in loco parentis bearing 
the responsibility of the duty to protect students. Both duty 
and privilege are imputed to educators. As seen in Hinson, a 
concomitant duty of the parent may be some qualified form of 
parental immunity. 51 The funeral pyre of in loco parentis 
should not be lit; it lives, influences, and structures the school's 
relationship to its students. 
Parents have a duty to protect their children on penalty of 
termination of parental rights. The schools, when acting in 
place of the parent, have a similar duty to protect students 
placed in their charge. This paper will explore three causes of 
action that have attempted to assert this duty to protect stu-
dents with consequences for breach of that duty. But first, it is 
important to put a story and a face with the issue of sexual 
abuse of a student perpetrated by an educator. 
46. ld.; see Suits v. Glover 71 S.2d 49, 50 (Ala. 1954) ("[a] schoolmaster is re-
garded as standing in loco parentis and has the authority to administer moderate cor-
rection to pupils under his care."). 
47. Hinson, 776 S.2d at 811; Mitchell v. Davis, 598 S.2d 801, 803 (Ala. 1992). 
48. Hinson, 776 S.2d at 811. For a discussion of the parent-child immunity doc-
trine see Dena M. Dietrich, Student Author, Eagan v. Calhoun: A Child May Bring a 
Wrongful Death Action Against a Parent for the Intentional Killing of the Other Parent, 
28 U. Bait. L. Rev. 235, 237 (1998). 
49. 776 S.2d at 811. 
50. ld. (quoting Mitchell, 598 S.2d at 806). 
51. Id. 
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IV. ALIDA'S PLIGHT: THE STORY OF A VICTIM 
In the spring of 1991, Frank Waldrop, a teacher at Lago 
Vista High School, made sexually suggestive remarks to stu-
dents during after-school book discussion sessions at his high 
school.52 Alida Star Gebser had received permission to attend 
the sessions even though she was an eighth grader in a middle 
school in the same school district. 53 When Gebser attended the 
high school in the fall as a freshman, she was assigned to 
Waldrop's classes both semesters. 54 Waldrop continued to make 
inappropriate remarks to his students, and he started to target 
Gebser for many of the more suggestive comments.55 In the 
spring of Gebser's freshman year, Waldrop visited Gebser's 
home, ostensibly to give her a book. 56 He kissed and fondled 
her. 57 The two had sexual intercourse soon after on a number of 
occasions during the remainder of the school :!sear, through the 
summer, and into the following school year. 8 They often had 
intercourse during class time although never on school prop-
erty.59 During the summer, Gebser was Waldrop's only student 
in an advanced placement class and the two often had sexual 
intercourse during the time allotted for the class.60 It wasn't 
until January of 1993 that a police officer discovered Waldrop 
and the minor Gebser having sexual intercourse that the abu-
sive situation came to light. 61 
Alida did not report the abuse to school officials testifying 
that "while she realized Waldrop's conduct was improper, she 
was uncertain how to react and she wanted to continue having 
him as a teacher."62 Gebser stated that she declined to report 
the sexual relationship because "if I was to blow the whistle on 
that, then I wouldn't be able to have this person as a teacher 
anymore" and that Waldrop "was the person in Lago admini-
52. Gebser v. Lago Vista lndep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998). 
53. /d. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 277-78. 
56. Id. at 278. 
57. Id. 
58. /d. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. ld. 
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stration ... who I most trusted. "68 She trusted her teacher and 
that trust provided the lever for her abuse. The trust that a 
child gives to a teacher is not unlike the trust that the child 
has for a parent. 
V. THREE THEORIES WHERE THE DUTY TO PROTECT H&S BEEN 
AsSERTED 
A. Respondeat Superior: The Vicarious Liability of the 
Employer 
Vicarious liability of an employer for an employee's act has 
a long history in English law in which masters were responsi-
ble for the acts of their servants. The Latin term is respondeat 
superior or "let the master answer." In certain instances, an 
employer can be liable under agency principles not only for em-
ployees' negligent acts but for criminal acts as well. 64 
The modern justification for vicarious liability is a policy of 
allocation of risk. Prosser and Keeton noted that vicarious li-
ability is placed on the employer because having engaged in an 
enterprise which will, on the basis of past experience, involve 
harm to others through the actions of its employees, it is better 
that the employer bear the costs than the innocent injured 
plaintiff.65 It is a cost of doing business because the employer is 
better able to absorb the costs and to distribute them through 
increased prices to the community at large. "Added to this is 
the makeweight argument that an employer who is held 
strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in 
the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and 
to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted 
safely."66 Should a school be held to a lesser standard when it 
comes to the acts of its employees sexually abusing students? 
The selection, instruction, and supervision of school employees 
to provide a safe school environment should be a public policy 
worth pursuing at least as much as selecting employees to 
maintain a safe marketplace. 
63. Id. at 299-300 n. 10 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
64. Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 231 (1958). 
65. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 500-01 (W. 
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed., West Publg. Co. 1984). 
66. I d. at 501. 
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In general, an employer will be liable for the tortuous con-
duct of an employee when the employer has actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the employee's acts. Actual knowledge exists 
when a supervisory employee has witnessed the tortuous act or 
actually engages in the act. An employer is also deemed to have 
actual knowledge if a complaint about the employee's conduct 
is delivered to a supervisor especially when the employer fails 
to take action on the complaint. An employer is considered to 
have constructive knowledge of an employee's wrongful conduct 
if the employer could have learned about the conduct through 
reasonable supervision. The pervasiveness of the act may also 
provide the basis for an employer's constructive knowledge. For 
example, in Sims v. Montgomery County Commission, sexual 
harassment in the workplace was "so open and pervasive that 
all those in supervisory authority should have known about 
it."67 
Respondeat superior is a "bare formula" used to cover the 
unordered and unauthorized acts of the servant for which the 
master must bear the burden of paying.68 "It refers to those 
acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is 
employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, 
that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite im-
proper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employ-
ment."69 This is often referred to as acting within the scope of 
ones employment or doing those things that the employee is 
70 
employed to perform. It would appear that the ser-
vant/employee would be acting outside the scope of his em-
ployment if his conduct serves his own purpose rather than the 
concerns of his master/employer, as in the case of an educator 
sexually abusing a student. 
For example, in a 1984 decision, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals dismissed a complaint against the District of 
Columbia School District arising from the sexual assault of a 
blind, deaf, mute student by the coordinator of the program.71 
The court found that the school district employee's conduct was 
outside the course of his duties; thus the district was not liable 
67. Sims u. Montgomery County Commn., 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1075 (M.D. Ala. 
1990). 
68. Keeton, supra n. 65, at 502. 
69. ld. 
70. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228. 
71. Boykin u. D.C., 484 A.2d 560, 561 (D.C. App. 1984). 
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under respondeat superior.72 Similarly, in 1990, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court found, in a case involving accusa-
tions of child abuse at a private day school, that the school 
could not be held liable for sexual assaults allegedly committed 
at the school.73 The court wrote, "these acts obviously were not 
'of the kind [the employees were] employed to perform,' nor 
were they 'motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the 
74 
employer'." 
Although no clear general pattern has emerged with regard 
to respondeat superior liability for an employee's sexual mis-
conduct, a trend does seem to be developing in the law en-
forcement and health care occupations. In several cases, courts 
have been willing to hold employers vicariously liable for the 
actions of the employee even though the employee is not moti-
vated by a purpose to serve the employer. 
A California Supreme Court case, M. v. City of Los Angeles, 
is the leading case in this area. 75 In M., a woman was driving 
home alone late one night when a police officer stopped her for 
erratic driving. 76 The officer was on duty, in uniform, wore a 
bad~e and a gun, and was driving a black-and-white police 
car. 
7 M. had been drinking and performed poorly on the field 
sobriety test that the police officer asked her to perform. 78 She 
began to cry and pleaded with the officer not to be taken to 
jail.79 The officer ordered her to get into the front seat of the po-
lice car, and then he drove her home. 80 After entering her 
home, the police officer told the woman he expected "payment" 
for taking her home instead of to jail. 81 The woman tried to run 
away, but the officer grabbed her, threw her on the couch, and 
72. !d. 
73. Worcester Ins. Co. u. Fells Acres Day Sch. Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 967 (Mass. 
1990). 
74. !d. (brackets in original) (quoting Wang Laboratories, Inc. u. Bus. Incentives, 
Inc., 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Mass. 1986)). 
75. M. u. City of L.A., 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991). 
76. !d. at 1342. 
77. !d. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. /d. 
81. Id. 
17] DOCTRINE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS 31 
raped her. 82 He was subsequently convicted of rape and sen-
tenced to prison. 83 
The woman brought a civil suit against the officer and the 
City of Los Angeles, which she won at the trial court level.84 
The appeals court reversed the judgment, holding, as a matter 
of law, that the officer was acting outside the scope of his em-
ployment when he committed the rape. 85 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the city could be held vicariously liable for the officer's 
sexual assault. 86 "Respondeat superior," the court observed, "is 
based on a '"deeply rooted sentiment"' that it would be unjust 
for an enterprise to disclaim responsibility for injuries occur-
ring in the course of its characteristic activities."87 Although the 
doctrine only applies if the employee is acting within the scope 
of his employment, the court made it clear that an employee 
can sometimes be acting within the scope of his employment 
even when his tortious conduct violates his official duties or 
disregards the employer's express order.88 
The California court then cited the rule for deciding if an 
employee's tortious conduct was committed within the scope of 
employment.89 "A risk arises out of the employment," the court 
wrote, "when ... 'an employee's conduct is not so unusual or 
startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting 
from it among other costs of the employer's business'."90 Ger-
mane to the in loco parentis power and the power of the state 
that educators wield over students, the California Supreme 
Court held: 
[W]e observed that society has granted police officers extraor-
dinary power and authority over its citizenry. An officer who 
detains an individual is acting as the official representative of 
the state, with all of its coercive power. As visible symbols of 
82. Id. at 1342-43. 
83. Id. at 1343. 
84. I d. 
85. I d. 
86. Id. at 1347. 
87. Id. at 1343 (quoting Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148 
(App. 4th Dist. 1975) (quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S., 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d 
Cir. 1968))). 
88. Id. at 1344. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1344 (quoting Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676, 678 
(Cal. 1986) (quoting Rodgers, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 149)). 
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that power, an officer is given a distinctively marked car, a 
uniform, a badge, and a gun .... The cost resulting from mis-
use of that power should be borne by the community, because 
of the substantial benefits that the community derives from 
the lawful exercise of police power.91 
In addition to law enforcement agencies, courts have been 
increasingly willing to hold health care enterprises vicariously 
liable for sexual misconduct committed by their employees. For 
example, in Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, the Alaska 
Supreme Court held that a counseling center could be held li-
able for the averred sexual misconduct of one of its therapists. 92 
In that case, Jane Doe accused a counselor of misusing the 
transference phenomenon to bring about a sexual relationshiS 
that began about a month after Doe terminated her therapy.· 3 
No sexual intercourse occurred during the therapeutic relation-
ship, and all sexual liaisons took place off the premises of the 
counseling center. 94 
The counseling center petitioned the court to dismiss Jane 
Doe's respondeat superior claim as well as the negligence 
claim.95 The center argued that it could not be vicariously liable 
for the counselor's sexual misconduct because the counselor 
was acting purely in furtherance of his own interests and not 
the interests ofhis employer.96 
The Alaska Supreme Court was persuaded by a Ninth Cir-
cuit opinion where the court reasoned that although a social 
worker had not been authorized to become sexually involved 
with his patients, nonetheless, sexual misconduct occurred in 
conjunction with his legitimate counseling activities, and, 
therefore, the employer could be liable.97 The high court in 
Alaska held that a jury might reasonably find that the coun-
selor's sexual misconduct "arose out of, and was reasonably in-
cidental to counseling activities authorized by and of potential 
benefit to [the counseling center]."98 
91. Id. at 1349. 
92. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 345 (Alaska 1990). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. I d. at 346. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 348; Simmons v. U.S., 805 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986). 
98. Doe, 791 P.2d at 348 n. 7. 
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In a 1992 case involving a hospital employee's sexual as-
sault on a 16-year old psychiatric patient, the Louisiana Court 
of Appeals held that the hospital was vicariously liable for its 
employee's act. 99 According to the court, the incident occurred 
while the assailant was on duty taking care of the patient's 
well being, and his misconduct was reasonably incidental and 
closely connected to his employment duties. 100 
A trend is emerging where health care providers and law 
enforcement agencies are held vicariously liable for sexual as-
saults committed by their employees regardless of whether the 
employer was negligent. 101 In many of these cases, courts have 
stressed the fact that the employees exercise considerable con-
trol over their victims. 102 The courts have also found that it is 
reasonable to anticipate sexual misconduct in those settings, 
and that respondeat superior liability would encourage the em-
ployers to take effective preventative measures. 103 
If adult victims are protected by the use of respondeat supe-
rior by forcing employers to be more vigilant or to face the eco-
nomic consequences of a lawsuit, should children who are en-
trusted to a educator's care and compelled to attend school 
receive the same measure of protection from educators that 
adults are starting to receive from health care workers and the 
police? 
Despite the expansion of liability for law enforcement and 
health care, sexual assaults perpetrated by school employees 
on students have been consistently found to be outside of the 
scope of employment, thus shielding the school district from re-
spondeat superior liability. Unfortunately, courts do not appre-
ciate that school employees are aided in their misconduct by 
the power and authority they have over children given to them 
by virtue of their school employment and its attendant in loco 
parentis status. While the courts have not accepted this con-
nection between authority by virtue of employment and the 
sexual abuse of a student, the United States Department of 
99. Samuels u.S. Baptist Hasp., 594 S.2d 571, 574 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992). 
100. !d. 
101. Richard Fossey & Todd A. DeMitchell, "Let the Master Answer": Holding 
Schools Vicariously Liable when Employees Sexually Abuse Children, 25 J.L. & Educ. 
575, 580 (1996). 
102. Id. at 586. 
103. !d. at 592. 
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Education's Office of Civil Rights issued guidelines that do. 104 
The Sexual Harassment Guidance notes that school districts 
are liable for quid pro quo sexual discrimination when the em-
ployee acted with apparent authority or was aided in carrying 
out the abuse by his or her position of authority within the in-
stitution.105 A teacher or principal is aided in the sexual abuse 
of a student through his or her employment. School employ-
ment allows for access to and provides power over students. 
Sexual assaults in schools, like those that take place in police 
cruisers, hospitals, and therapists' offices, often involve an 
abuse of job-created power. Sexually abusive teachers, like 
sexually abusive police officers and health care workers, mis-
use the authority of their positions when they sexually molest 
children under their control. If it makes sense to hold police 
departments and health care employers vicariously liable for 
these assaults, it marr make sense to hold school districts li-
able for them as well. 06 
Although the courts give no uniform explanation for impos-
ing vicarious liability on law enforcement agencies and health 
care providers, two themes are woven through this line of 
cases. First, the courts have concluded that sexual assaults in 
law enforcement and health care settings are foreseeable given 
the nature of the employer's mission. 107 Second, the courts view 
the victims of these assaults as being particularly vulnerable 
due to the perpetrator's authority over the victim-authority 
they obtained from their employment status.108 
In contrast, courts have not held schools vicariously liable 
for their employees' sexual assaults because the courts consider 
such assaults to be unforeseeable aberrations that schools can-
not anticipate or guard against. 109 Likewise, courts do not ap-
preciate that school employees are aided in their misconduct by 
the power and authority they have over children given to them 
by virtue of their school employment. Should the same legal 
104. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, 
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12037 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
105. Id. 
106. Fossey & DeMitchell, supra n. 101, at 598. 
107. Id. at 592. 
108. Id. at 590. 
109. R. u. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 955 n. 9 (Cal. 1989); Young ex 
rel. Whitson u. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291-92 (App. 1st Dist. 
1981). 
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reasoning that applies in law enforcement and health care 
situations also apply to children in school districts? 
Under the theory of respondeat superior, the employer is 
only responsible for the actions of its employee when he or she 
is acting within the scope of employment. The sexual abuse of a 
student is never within the scope of employment. However, it is 
the employment that gives abusers access to student victims. It 
is also the authority attached to the employment in the schools 
that helps to render students powerless to protect themselves 
from assault. 110 
The custodial or supervisory control that an educator wields 
over a student is similar to that of a parent. 111 The role of the 
parent does not encompass sexually abusing his or her own 
child or allowing child to be abused. However, society will take 
action against the parent who sexually abuses his or her child 
by temporarily or permanently revoking parental rights. If 
those rights can be terminated as a means of holding the par-
ent accountable for the welfare of the child, should not schools 
be similarly held responsible when acting in the role of the par-
ent? 
B. A Constitutional Duty to Protect 
The second area of investigation in which the interests of 
children appear not to be served is the constitutional duty to 
protect. The first section looked to respondeat superior I agency 
theories as its legal foundation for employer liability whereas 
this section looks to the Constitution ofthe United States to as-
certain what duty of protection the state and its entities, such 
as schools, owe its students. 
As a general proposition, government agencies do not have 
an affirmative duty under the Constitution to protect citizens 
from injury. However, the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized certain exceptions to this rule. 112 States have an af-
firmative duty to protect those with whom they have a custo-
dial relationship. Specifically, states have an affirmative duty 
110. See Richard Fossey, Law, Trauma, and Sexual Abuse in the Schools: Why 
Can't Children Protect Themselves?, 91 Educ. L. Rptr. 443 (1994). 
111. See generally Krampen v. Va., 510 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va. App. 1999) (defendant 
could be convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child because the mother's en-
trustment of the victim child to the defendant for transporting to and from church 
placed him in a custodial or supervisory relationship). 
112. Des haney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serus., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989). 
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to protect incarcerated prisoners and hospitalized mental pa-
tients from harm because those persons are unable to care for 
themselves. 113 It has sometimes been said that the state has a 
"special relationship" with persons it holds in custody. This 
"special relationship" requires the state to assume responsibil-
ity for the safety and general well being of these persons. 114 
Courts generally have not been willing to extend the protec-
tion of a "special relationship" to encompass school children. 115 
For example, in a 1990 case involving accusations of abuse by 
three students against a teacher, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the analoW between 
school children and prisoners or mental patients. 11 Prisoners 
and mental patients, the court wrote, "are unable to provide for 
basic human needs like food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 
and reasonable safety."117 In contrast, the state merely requires 
a child to attend school, which does not prevent the child from 
meeting her basic human needs. By mandating school atten-
dance, the court said, "the state ... has not assumed responsi-
bility for [the children's] entire personal lives; these children 
and their parents retain substantial freedom to act."118 The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that school children are not entitled 
to the special constitutional protection given to prisoners and 
mental patients. "The analogy of a school yard to a prison may 
be a popular one for school-age children," the court observed, 
"but we cannot recognize constitutional duties on a child's la-
ment."119 Similarly, the Third Circuit in D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. 
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School reasoned that 
the school did not have a constitutional duty to protect stu-
dents from the sexual harassment of other students because, 
despite the in loco parentis authority of the school, the stu-
d t ' t . d th . . 120 ens parens remame e pnmary caregivers. 
By refusing to equate school children with prisoners and 
mental patients, the federal courts advance a good argument. 
113. !d. 
114. Id. at 194. 
115. James M. Kemp, DeShaney and Its Progeny-The Failure to Mandate that 
Public School Officials Protect Our Tender Youth, 24 J.L. & Educ. 679 (1995). 
113.J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990). 
117. ld. at 272. 
118. Id. 
119. !d. 
120. D.R. ex rel. L.R. u. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 
1364, 1370-72 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane). 
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In fact, a school child's status is far different from that of a 
prisoner or a confined mental patient. Unlike prisoners and 
mental patients, schoolchildren are not physically confined, 
and they are not in full-time custody; they can go home at the 
end of the school day. As several courts have noted, if children 
are sexually assaulted, they are free to leave the school 
grounds, call their parents/guardians, or seek other outside 
help. 
However, as Fossey has pointed out, if we look deeper, we 
are compelled to ask whether there is something about the dy-
namics of sexual abuse itself that renders some school children 
helpless and prevents them from seeking and finding effective 
121 
assistance. "If there is, then the federal courts are wrong to 
suggest that school children can protect themselves from as-
sault."122 The trauma of sexual molestation, especially by a 
trusted individual, may diminish a child's ability to fend off 
further abuse. Richard Kluft, who studied incest victims who 
were later sexually exploited by their therapists, called the 
phenomenon the "sitting duck syndrome."123 Sexual abuse im-
pairs a child's thought processes in ways that may increase his 
or her vulnerability to further harm. Victims may develop 
pathological attachments to their abusers, inhibiting them 
from reporting the abuse to their parents or teachers. "Finally, 
child abuse victims may exhibit tendencies of 'learned help-
les~ness,' a reduced capacity to protect themselves from exploi-
tatiOn and a tendency to recreate the original trauma even by 
d . 124 ' en urmg more abuse." 
Robb, in her note, utilized an in loco parentis analysis to 
conclude that there was a constitutional duty to protect Jamie 
Nabozny who had "endured four years of such torture as his 
cl_assmates repeatedly harassed him, beat him, urinated upon 
h1m, and performed a mock rape on him because he was gay."125 
~er note argued that state laws and school policies grounded in 
m loco parentis limited Nabozny's freedom to act on his own 
behalf against the abuse from his classmates. 126 
121. Fossey, ~;upra n. 110, at 449. 
122. Id. 
123. Richard P. Kluft, Treating the Patient Who Has Been Sexually Exploited by a 
Prevwus TherapLst, 12 Psychiatric Clinics ofN. Am. 483, 486 (1989). 
124. Fossey, supra n. 110, at 453. 
125. Randall Robb, supra n. 14, at 317. 
126. Id. at 325. 
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Specifically, Ashland School adopted and exercised its in loco 
parentis power with these policies which prohibited Nabozny 
from leaving school in dangerous situations or from fighting 
back. The school gave him no options as the power rested with 
127 
the school. 
School children who are sexually abused by the very people 
who are entrusted with caring for them while at school are 
quite like prisoners, "made captive by the condition of their de-
pendency/' and are shackled by confusion, shame, isolation, 
and fear. 28 "Schoolchildren are particularly vulnerable to mis-
treatment at the hands of adults, especially where those adults 
are cloaked with the authority of the state."129 
Students enjoy the protection of their parents. The parental 
duty of custodial supervision is transferred to the school under 
in loco parentis. However, the Third Circuit in Middle Bucks 
reasoned that the state's in loco parentis statute provided au-
thority to public school teachers but did not "impose a duty 
upon them."130 Governmental authority exercised through pub-
lic schools without a duty or responsibility to the subjects of the 
authority seems a thin gruel on which to base such an impor-
tant public service. The potential of authority without respon-
sibility, at best, allows for mischief and, at worst, abuse of 
those situated with the least ability to protect themselves. It is 
a poor profession that does not owe a duty of responsibility or 
care to its clients. If the school assumes the duty of the parent 
then it can be argued that students must turn to the school for 
"reasonable security" from sexual abuse while at school. The 
state as an educator has a different relationship with students 
than when the state acts as a sovereign. In the role of educator, 
the state essentially acts as a parent. 
The Constitutional view of this "special relationship" or 
duty to protect, however, has not prevailed. Instead of the 
common law view that the school is acting in the place of the 
parent, courts have likened the constitutional relationship be-
tween school and student to be one of a third party lacking a 
special relationship. If students are nothing more than third 
127. /d. at 329 (emphasis added). 
128. Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery 74 (BasicBooks 1992). 
129. Doe ex rel. Knackert v. Estes, 926 F. Supp. 979, 988 (D. Nev. 1996). 
130. 972 F.2d at 1371 (quoting Pa. St. Educ. Assn. v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 449 
A.2d 89, 92 (Pa. Cmmw. 1982), overruled, Pa. v. Gerstner, 656 A.2d 108, 113-14 (Pa. 
1995)) 
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parties, the state, through its schools, owes no duty to protect 
them. The student is no different than any one who happens to 
visit the school; there is no special relationship, no bond, and 
no trust upon which the student may rely. This would be simi-
lar to a situation in which a parent's relationship to his or her 
children would be one of two strangers where no duty exists. 
C. Title IX 
The last theory to be discussed is the federal anti-
discrimination statute, Title IX. The sexual abuse of Alida Geb-
ser by her teacher Waldrop provides the fact pattern for the 
Supreme Court's decision on the application of Title IX to 
teacher-student sexual abuse. The Court's opinion explains 
what duty is owed to students by educators under Title IX. 
Congress passed Title IX as part of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972. It was enacted after extensive hearings by the 
House Special Subcommittee on Education in 1970 revealed 
pervasive discrimination against women with respect to educa-
tional opportunities. 131 Title IX seeks to avoid the use of federal 
funds to support discriminatory practices and "to provide indi-
vidual citizens effective protection against those [discrimina-
tory] practices."m The law provides that "[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."133 Thus, the law applies to virtu-
ally every school district and college in the United States. 
Title IX is an anti-discrimination statute, modeled after Ti-
tle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 134 According to Senator 
Bayh, Title IX's sponsor, the statute was intended to: 
[P]rovide for the women of America something that is right-
fully theirs-an equal chance to attend the schools of their 
choice, to develop the skills they want, and to apply those 
I.:H. 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972). 
132. Cannon u. U. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). 
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). 
134. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (Title VI prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, or national origin in institutions benefiting from federal funds). 
40 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2002 
skills with the knowledge that they will have a fair chance to 
secure. the jobs of their choice with equal pay for equal 
k U5 wor . 
Until the mid-1990s, there have been few court cases in-
volving sexual harassment or abuse of students under Title IX. 
The primary reason for this dearth of cases was uncertainty 
whether the law authorized plaintiffs to recover money dam-
ages for a Title IX violation. The paucity of cases led one com-
mentator to observe that "Title IX as a statutory remedy has 
proven to be virtually without bite."136 One reason for this lack 
of bite is because unlike tort actions and lawsuits for constitu-
tional deprivations, which can be brought against both school 
districts and individual school employees, Title IX lawsuits can 
only be brought against public entities. 137 Thus, in a Title IX 
claim, the school district is the only defendant. Another reason 
for the lack of bite is that the express statutory means of en-
forcing Title IX is termination of federal funds to the school dis-
trict. 
The Court handed down its ruling in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District on June 22, 1998, giving, for the 
first time, a definitive ruling on what standard a plaintiff stu-
dent could prevail in a Title IX action alleging sexual abuse 
perpetrated by an educator. 138 The Court in a five to four deci-
sion held: 
[D]amages may not be recovered in those circumstances 
[teacher-student sexual harassment in an implied private ac-
tion under Title IX] unless an official of the school district 
who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective meas-
ures on the district's behalf has actual notice o~ and is delib-
erately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct.l. 9 
135. 118 Cong. Rec. 5808 (1972). 
136. Kimberly A. Mango, Student Author, Students Versus Professors: Combating 
Sexual Harassment under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 Conn. L. 
Rev. 355, 411 (1991). 
137. See Kinman u. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607,611 (8th Cir. 1999) (Title 
IX will not support an action against a teacher in her individual capacity.). 
135.524 U.S. 274. 
139. ld. at 277. 
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1. The Majority's Opinion in Gebser 
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined. Addi-
tionally, Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Justices Souter, and Breyer joined.140 
The plaintiff, Gebser, asserted that the standards used un-
der Title VII, covering discrimination in the workplace when a 
supervisor sexually harasses an employee, should guide the 
Court. The plaintiff pointed to Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public Schools where the Court analogized Title IX to Title VII 
as follows: '"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate 
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discrimi-
nate[s)" on the basis of sex.' We believe the same rule should 
apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a stu-
dent."141 Plaintiff, relying on the comparison in Franklin of 
teacher-student harassment with supervisor-employee har-
assment, argued that agency principles/respondeat superwr 
should apply. 
The plaintiff and amicus curiae advanced two possible 
standards under which the school district would be liable for 
Waldrop's sexual abuse of Gebser. First, relying on a 1997 "Pol-
icy Guidance" issued by the Department of Education, a school 
district would be held liable under Title IX where a teacher is 
'"aided in carrying out the sexual harassment of students by 
his or her position of authority with the institution"' irrespec-
tive of whether school district officials had any knowledge of 
the harassment and irrespective of their response upon becom-
ing aware. 142 This rule is an expression of vicarious liability in 
which a teacher's authority over a student facilitates the 
harassment. 143 The second theory advanced by the plaintiffwas 
140. !d. at 276. 
141. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (citation omit-
ted) (brackets in original) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 
(1986)). 
142. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 12039). 
143. !d. 
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constructive knowledge. 144 Under this theory, the school district 
would be liable when the school authorities knew or should 
have known about the harassment but failed to uncover it and 
eliminate it. 145 Both of these theories expand the range of situa-
tions under which the school district would be held liable. The 
court of appeals rejected these theories in favor of an actual 
146 knowledge standard. 
The majority's analysis of the petitioner's asserted rights of 
recovery began with a clarification of the Franklin decision. 
The Court argued that Franklin did not resolve whether Title 
IX was violated under vicarious liability or constructive notice 
standards. 147 The quotation from Franklin citing Meritor Sav-
ings Bank FSB v. Vinson was made with regard to the general 
proposition that sexual harassment can constitute discrimina-
tion based on sex under Title IX. 148 Moreover, the Court stated 
that the agency principle aspect of Title VII rests on an aspect 
of that legislation that is missing in Title IX. 149 Therefore, Title 
IX contains no comparable reference to an educational institu-
tion's agents; thus agency Ji?rinciples or respondeat superior do 
not apply in Title IX cases. 0 
The Court further distanced Title IX from Title VII by not-
ing that Title VII contains an express private cause of action 
and provides for relief in the form of monetary damages. 151 As 
Congress made no specific provisions for Title IX, the private 
right of action against an institution that violates Title IX is 
judicially implied.152 Because the private right of action under 
Title IX is judicially implied, the courts "have a measure of lati-
tude to shape a sensible remedial scheme that best comports 
with the statute."153 It is this "measure of latitude" that went 
unfulfilled in the eyes of the dissent. 154 The majority ascer-
tained that a judicially implied remedy called for the Court to 
144. ld. 
145. !d. 
146. Doe ex rel. Doe u. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 
1997), affd, Gebser u. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 293 (1998). 
147. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283. 
148. Id. 
149. ld. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. !d. at 283-84. 
153. Id. at 284. 
154. Id. at 293 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, J.J., dissenting). 
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fashion a remedy that was not at odds with the statutory struc-
ture and the purpose of the law. The purpose of Title IX is to 
rid educational institutions that receive federal funds of gen-
der-based discrimination. It is difficult to imagine a more gen-
der-based discriminatory act than an employee with whom the 
school entrusts its students sexually abusing a student while 
aided in the abuse by the teacher-student relationship. Unfor-
tunately, the majority developed a different viewpoint. 
The majority acknowledged that the general rule in Frank-
lin was that all appropriate relief is available in an action 
brought to vindicate a federal right; however, it immediately 
clarified this position by stating that the rule must be recon-
ciled with congressional purpose. 155 "The 'general rule'," they 
asserted, "yields where necessary to carry out the intent of 
Congress or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the statute in-
volved."156 Even though the High Court quoted Title IX objec-
tives as "avoid[ing] the use of federal resources to support dis-
criminatory practices" and providing "individual citizens 
effective protection against those practices,"157 the majority 
held that recovery for sex discrimination perpetrated by a 
teacher could not be permitted under the theories of respondeat 
superior or constructive notice without actual notice to a school 
official. 158 In other words, even though a school is prohibited 
from discriminating against students, a school district is not li-
able for the actions of an employee when he or she sexually 
abuses one of his or her students even though it was the em-
ployment relationship that aided the abuse. Also, a school dis-
trict is not liable for violating Title IX unless the school officials 
received actual notice of the abuse, which often takes place in 
secret. The school district is not liable if through supervisory 
diligence it should have known about the abuse. If the school 
officials do nothing and the student who is being sexually ex-
ploited by a teacher does not come forward, chances are the 
abused student will have no recourse to appropriate relief for 
the injury. 
The Court analyzed what it thought Congress would have 
said had it addressed the issue of a private right of recovery of 
155. Id. at 285. 
156. !d. (quoting Guardians Assn. u. Civ. Serv. Commn. of City of N.Y., 463 U.S. 
582, 595 (1983) (plurality)). 
157. Id. at 286 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704). 
158. ld. at 292. 
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damages for violation of Title IX. "When Title IX was enacted 
in 1972, the principal civil rights statutes [referring to Title 
VII] containing an express right of action did not provide for 
recovery of monetary damages at all, instead allowing only in-
junctive and equitable relief."159 Congress did not make dam-
ages available under Title VII until 1991 and then limited the 
amount recoverable in any one case. 160 The Court argued that 
since Congress limited damage awards for Title VII, Congress 
did not intend to make available unlimited damage awards un-
der Title IX. 161 
This contractual framework distinguishes Title IX from Ti-
tle VII, "which is framed in terms not of a condition but of an 
outright prohibition."162 Title VII applies to all employers hav-
ing over fifteen employees without regard to federal funding 
and aims broadly to eradicate discrimination throughout our 
economic system. To further distinguish Title VII from Title IX, 
the Court noted that Title VII seeks to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered through past discrimination. 163 Whereas Title 
VII seeks to compensate victims of discrimination, Title IX fo-
cuses on protecting individuals from discriminatory prac-
tices.164 The reasoning of the majority seems somewhat convo-
luted and paints a picture of a Congress that clearly will 
interfere in a "free-market" system to gain an objective-the 
protection of adults from discrimination. How the eradication 
of discrimination is different from protecting individuals from 
discriminatory practices does not seem apparent, yet it is one of 
the defining differences between the two pieces of civil rights 
legislation that dictates the degree of protection that the fed-
eral government is willing to extend, according to the majority 
of the Court. This view also supports the contention that the 
federal government is more willing to regulate and hold non-
recipients of federal funds more accountable for their actions 
than they are willing to hold those entities that receive direct 
federal assistance accountable. This seems to be an anomalous 
situation. On the one hand, if a business is not receiving any 
federal help, the government will oversee it with greater scru-
159. Id. at 285. 
160. Id. at 285-86. 
161. ld. at 286. 
162. !d. 
163. Id. at 287. 
164. !d. 
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tiny than those entities that receive a direct subsidy. It would 
appear that the government, through complicity of financial 
assistance, is less willing to further federal objectives with 
those whom it supports directly than those with whom there-
lationship is tangential. It should also be noted that Title VII is 
aimed at the adult population while Title IX clearly targets a 
student population. In other words, according to the Court, 
Congress is more willing to protect adults (Title VII) than chil-
dren (Title IX). 
Amy Busa compared the standard of liability under Title 
VII in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Indus-
tries v. Ellerth with the Gebser standard. 165 Faragher and Bur-
lington utilized employer liability through agency principles, a 
theory of recovery denied to schoolchildren. "This is true de-
spite the fact that a school has a greater duty to frotect its stu-
dents than an employer has for its employees."16 
The contractual nature of Title IX became the touchstone 
for the Court's argument. The Court was concerned that recipi-
ents of federal funds had not received notice of potential liabil-
ity for damages under Title IX. 167 Justice O'Connor believed 
that Congress did not intend to allow recovery in damages on 
the principles of vicarious liability or constructive notice be-
cause their means of enforcement are not predicated on actual 
notice to the officials. 168 Since the statute envisions enforce-
ment through an administrative agency, the agency cannot 
withhold federal funds until the appropriate school officials had 
been notified of possible non-compliance. 169 Upon notification of 
a violation of Title IX, the recipient may be required to take ef-
fective remedial action but is not required to pay monetary 
170 damages. 
Presumably, a central purpose of requiring notice of the viola-
tion "to the appropriate person" and an opportunity for volun-
tary compliance before administrative enforcement proceed-
165. Amy Busa, Student Author, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Supreme 
Court's Treatment of Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment in Gebser v. Lago Vista In-
dependent School District, 34 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 279 (1999); see 
Faragher v. City o{Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742 (1998); Gebser, 524 U.S. 274. 
166. Busa, supra n. 165, at 280. 
167. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287. 
168. Id. at 288. 
169. ld. 
170. Id. at 288-89. 
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ings can commence is to avoid diverting education funding 
from beneficial uses where a recipient was unaware of dis-
crimination in its prowams and is willing to institute prompt 
corrective measures. 1 
The argument is that where a school district had no knowl-
edge of the teacher's discriminatory actions, the school district 
had no opportunity to take corrective action to end or limit the 
harassment. 
The Court concluded that the express remedial scheme un-
der Title IX is predicated upon notice to an "appropriate per-
son."172 The Court defined an appropriate person as one who 
"has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to in-
stitute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf."173 In ad-
dition, after an appropriate school official has received actual 
knowledge of the sexual abuse, the response to the complaint 
must amount to deliberate indifference.174 In other words, the 
school official receiving notice of the alleged abuse "refuses to 
take action to bring the recipient into compliance."175 
This is a high standard to meet for a statute aimed at pro-
tecting individuals from discriminatory practices in educational 
settings. This decision by the Supreme Court was made within 
the context of concluding statements, which acknowledged that 
"[t]he number of reported cases involving sexual harassment of 
students in schools confirms that harassment unfortunately is 
an all too common aspect of the educational experience."176 Jus-
tice O'Connor noted the "extraordinary harm" a student suffers 
when subjected to abuse by a teacher and that the teacher's 
171. !d. at 289. 
172. !d. at 290. 
173. !d. 
174. !d.; see Kinman, 171 F . .'ld at 610 (deliberate indifference is "turn[ing] a blind 
eye and do[ing] nothing" (quoting Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F . .'ld 46.'3, 467 
(8th Cir. 1996), overruled, Gebser v. Lago Vista lndep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998)); 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 15.'3 F . .'ld 211, 219 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[t]he de-
liberate indifference standard is a high one. Actions and decisions by officials that are 
merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliberate indiffer-
ence."); Ericson v. Syracuse U., .'35 F. Supp. 2d 326, .'328 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (deliberate in-
difference is the "purposeful failure ... to adequately respond"); Doe ex rel. Doe v. U. of 
Ill., 1.'38 F . .'ld 65.'3, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1998) ("it should be enough to avoid Title IX liabil-
ity if school officials investigate aggressively all complaints of sexual harassment and 
respond consistently and meaningfully when those complaints are found to have 
merit."), vacated, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999). 
175. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. 
176. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292. 
17] DOCTRINE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS 47 
reprehensible conduct undermines the basic purpose of the 
educational system.177 However, until "Congress speaks directly 
on the subject ... we will not hold a school district liable in 
damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a 
student absent actual notice and deliberate indifference."178 
2. Dissenting opinion in Gebser 
In pertinent part, the dissent argued that the Supreme 
Court has stood for the proposition that sexual harassment of a 
student by a teacher violates the duty of Title IX-assumed by 
the school district in exchange for federal funds-not to dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. Justice Stevens asserted in the 
dissent that the unanimous decision in Franklin was not ex-
plicitly overturned by the majority in Gebser and is, therefore, 
precedent. 179 Franklin stated that a teacher's intentional acts of 
sexual abuse of a student violate Title IX.180 Therefore, because 
Waldrop's sexual abuse of Gebser was also intentional, the 
abuse was a violation of Title IX. Furthermore, Waldrop's acts 
"occurred during, and as part of, a curriculum activity in which 
he wielded authority over Gebser that had been delegated to 
him by [the school district]. Moreover, it is undisputed that the 
activity was subsidized, in part, with federal moneys."181 
After establishing the viability of Franklin, the dissent re-
turned to the issue of agency principles discussed in Franklin-
'"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of 
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discriminate[s]" on the 
basis of sex.' We believe that the same rule should aoply when 
181". 
a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student." The anal-
ogy of supervisor to teacher and subordinate in the workplace 
to student is clear. From that starting point, Justice Stevens 
argued that the majority's rejection of respondeat superior li-
ability is unfounded. The majority's holding "is at odds with 
settled principles of agency law, [the law governing respondeat 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 292-93. 
179. !d. at 297 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
180. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298-99 (Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
181. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 297 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (brackets in original) (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75 (quoting Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986))). 
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superior or vicarious liability] under which the district is re-
sponsible for Waldrop's misconduct because 'he was aided in 
accomElishing the tort by the existence of the agency rela-
tion'." 3 The sexual abuse of Gebser by her teacher was made 
possible because of the powerful influence that a teacher has 
over a student by reason of the in loco parentis authority that 
the school district had delegated to him. "As a secondary school 
teacher, Waldrop exercised even greater authority and control 
over his students than employers and supervisors exercise over 
their employees. His gross misuse of that authority allowed 
him to abuse his young student's trust."184 The tutelary author-
ity that Waldrop exercised over Gebser was not unlike that 
wielded by a parent over a child. 
The dissent relied on the guidelines from the United States 
Department of Education as support for the applicability of 
agency principles when a teacher sexually abuses a student. 
The guidance from the Department of Education, the agency 
with authority over the administration and enforcement of Ti-
tle IX, stated that if one of a school district's teachers "was 
aided in carrying out the sexual harassment of students by his 
or her position of authority with the institution" the school dis-
trict violates Title IX. 185 The Department of Education's inter-
pretation of Title IX supports the conclusion that the school 
district is liable for Waldrop's sexual abuse of his student, 
which was made possible only by Waldrop's affirmative misuse 
of his authority as her teacher. This is the essence of agency li-
ability; when an employee entrusted with authority by an em-
ployer harms another person through the exercise of the 
granted authority, the employer is liable. This is what Waldrop 
did. He harmed his student through the authority of his posi-
tion as a teacher. Without that authority it is unlikely that 
Waldrop would have had the means and opportunity to harm 
Gebser. 
Agency theory, through common law, imposes liability on 
employers to induce them to adopt and enforce practices that 
will minimize the danger to third parties. The dissent argued 
that the majority created the opposite incentive. "As long as 
183. Id. at 298-99 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219). 
184. Id. at 299 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
185. !d. at 300 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 62 
Fed. Reg. at 12039). 
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school boards can insulate themselves from knowledge about 
this sort of conduct, they can claim immunity from damages li-
ability."186 The dissent went so far as to state that the majority 
bears the burden of justifying its "dramatic" departure from the 
established common law rule of agency, and in the opinion of 
the dissent, the majority failed to shoulder that burden. 187 The 
dissent supports many of the arguments advanced in the re-
spondeat superior section of this paper. 
3. Critique of Gebser 
Education is one of the great helping professions. It is 
founded on a trust given by society and parents that the well 
being of children will be primary and that the best interests of 
students shall be served by the actions of those in the profes-
sion. It is hard to imagine a viler act of a professional educator 
than the sexual abuse of those that have been placed in his or 
her charge. Title IX has been recognized as a tool and a remedy 
to help make our classrooms safe from discrimination in its 
overt and covert forms. While it is well settled that schools 
cannot ensure the safety of their students, they can be held ac-
countable when they do not act in a reasonable and profes-
sional manner. 
The majority's standard of actual knowledge of discrimina-
tory behavior by an official with authority to remedy the situa-
tion who acts with deliberate indifference to the complaint is 
too high a standard to protect our nation's schoolchildren. Title 
IX was enacted to prevent the abuse of students through dis-
criminatory conduct. When the bar of relief is set so high, the 
student is denied access to the relief. 188 The majority did not 
take into consideration the special conditions that exist in a 
school which allow the sexual perpetrator to hide his or her ac-
tions from view and the relative powerlessness of students to 
speak out on such matters. The dissent of Justice Stevens 
shreds the majority's position and properly asserts the viability 
of respondeat superior through agency principles. For all prac-
tical purposes, the majority has rendered Title IX as a private 
186. Id. at 300-0l(Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
187. Id. at 301 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
188. Busa, supra n. 165, at 309 ("[b]y applying such a harsh standard for a school 
district's liability under Title IX, the Court has not only created a high hurdle for a po-
tential plaintiff, but also ensured that Title IX will not be enforced effectively"). 
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right of recovery toothless. The dissent was correct when it as-
serted, "[a]s a matter of policy, the Court ranks protection of 
the school district's purse above the protection of immature 
high school students."189 This decision does not send a clear 
message to school officials that the sexual abuse of our stu-
dents will not be tolerated. The Supreme Court should have 
sent that message. 
VI. SCHOOL AS PARENT: THE DUTY TO PROTECT 
Schools, like parents, have a duty to protect children en-
trusted to their care. "The public expects schools to provide a 
safe haven that takes the place of parents during school hours, 
protect their children, and provide their children with a proper 
learning environment."190 Every state has recognized the par-
ents' duty, in part, by passing child abuse statutes.191 Parents 
who fail to protect their child may have their parental rights 
terminated. This is not a matter of little import. The United 
States Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts held that "[i]t 
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and 
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can nei-
ther supply nor hinder."192 Yet parental rights are terminated 
when parents fail to protect their children. In Tyler, Texas two 
girls were awarded $3.4 million when they successfully sued 
their parents for sexual abuse. 193 The stepfather was molesting 
the girls an average of two or three times a month. 194 When the 
girls told their mother, she simply replied they should say "no" 
the next time. 195 In Kentucky, it was established that parents 
189. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306. 
190. Cary Silverman, School Violence: Is It Time to Hold School Districts Respon-
sible for Inadequate Safety Measures? 145 Educ. L. Rptr. 535, 553 (2000). 
191. See Julie Solomon Rappaport, Student Author, The Legal System's Response 
to Child Abuse: A "Shield" for Children or a "Sword" Against the Constitutional Rights 
of Parents?, 9 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rights 257, 265 (1991). 
192. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
193. Amy L. Nilson, Student Author, Speaking Out Against Passive Parent Child 
Abuse: The Time Has Come to Hold Parents Liable for Failing to Protect Their Chil-
dren, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 253, 254 (2000). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
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have an affirmative duty to prevent physical injury to chil-
dren.196 
In addition, children in jurisdictions that do not recognize 
the doctrine of parental immunity can sue their parents. 197 
Schools act in loco parentis. But, is there a comparable duty be-
tween the parent and schools serving in loco parentis? Parents 
face a devastating loss for their failure to protect. For example, 
in an Illinois case, a mother lost custody of her son when her 
boyfriend broke the boy's leg. 198 However, when a school fails to 
protect a child there is no remedy against the school that is 
comparable to the parent losing custody of the child. The child 
has a property right to attend school. Consequently, removing a 
child from an abusive school is not possible, unlike removing a 
child from an abusive home. This would cause double harm to 
the child. However, should the school avoid its custodial and 
tutelary guardian role by not being held accountable in some 
manner when a school employee sexually abuses a student? 
Respondeat superior has consistently failed to hold schools 
liable in state courts. Likewise, no constitutional duty to pro-
tect students has been imposed. Turning to the federal gov-
ernment for a redress of harms suffered at the hands of a state 
employed educator has resulted in the Title IX bar being set so 
high that for most children it is out of reach. The dissent, not 
the majority, found an opportunity to hold schools accountable 
for the sexual abuse of a child. The dissent noted the connec-
tion of trust involved in the sexual abuse of a student; a trust 
derived, in part, from the educator acting in the place of the 
parent. Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire an-
chored the duty to protect students on the "role of schools as 
parental proxies over minor students."199 
It takes no intuitive leap or well-reasoned analysis to con-
clude that children should be able to attend school and be free 
from sexual abuse visited upon them by their teachers, princi-
196. Lane v. Ky., 956 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Ky. 1997). 
197. E.g. Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969); 
Nocktonick ex rel. Matson v. Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980); Wood ex rel. Wood v. 
Wood, 370 A.2d 191 (Vt. 1977); Elkington ex rel. C v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980). 
198. Ill. v. Stancicl, 606 N.E.2d 1201, 1204-05 (Ill. 1992). The mother continued 
the relationship with the boyfriend after she regained custody and allowed the boy-
friend to discipline the child. Eventually, the boyfriend beat the child to death. The Il-
linois Supreme Court found that the mother's conduct supported a showing of common 
criminal design sufficient to convict her of murder based on accountability. 
199. Schneider v. Plymouth St. College, 744 A.2d 101, 106 (N.H. 1999). 
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pals, or school bus drivers. Reform efforts that target curricu-
lum, school funding, and teacher preparation, but do not help 
to make the classroom a more secure place for children make a 
false promise of improvement. Efforts that target improving 
the workplace for adults but neglect students offer little hope of 
improving our schools in any meaningful way. 200 If there is any 
place where a child can go and be free from the fear of sexual 
abuse and sexual harassment, it should be the public schools. 
Instead, public schools are an environment where the students 
are too often harassed by their peers and even molested and 
assaulted by school personnel. 
Parents are held responsible for their duty to protect their 
children. The dissent in Seal v. Morgan argued that "in addi-
tion to their duty to educate, schools act in loco parentis."201 
The dissent in Seal used in loco parentis to support a strict 
zero-tolerance policy to ensure students' safety.20 The doctrine 
of in loco parentis supports the school's duty to protect students 
from harm in general, including the sexual abuse perpetrated 
by a school employee. Should not schools be held similarly re-
sponsible when they act in the role of the parent discharging its 
custodial and tutelary role and fail to protect students from 
sexual abuse perpetrated inside the schoolhouse gate? 
200. See Todd A. DeMitchell & Richard Fossey, The Limits of Law-Based School 
Reform: Vain Hopes and False Promises (Technomic Publg. Co. 1997). 
201. Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 582 (6th Cir. 2000) (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting 
in part). 
202. Id. 
